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Abstract: 
National borders in the eastern Himalaya region exhibit pressures of modernisation transition 
between two powerful emerging nation-states. The research question concerns under what 
circumstances borders are maintained. Consideration falls on the role of physical features, 
borders as cultural identity markers, and passes as transgressive spaces, negotiated through 
historical shifts in population and politics. A geopolitical history of boundary contestations in 
this region indicates the role of passes as conduits of political and cultural flows. Power relations 
bound space that cultural preservation makes worth delimiting. 
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Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. 
We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. 1 
Nation-states located along the Himalayan watershed between India and China face interrelated 
threats to their cultural, environmental, economic and political integrity. This study examines 
borders in the eastern Himalaya, highlighting cartographic changes as evidence of shifts in power 
extension and cultural contestation. Flat political lines and topographic shading show up clearly 
on a map; a fuller political geography considers the less visible dynamic alignments of culture 
(e.g., religion, language, ethnicity, customs), historical consequences of invasions and 
domination, and economic forces at work that are indispensable for understanding regional 
alignments. 
Borders are shaped by political considerations that in some cases transgress and in other cases 
preserve political identity ties of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These distinctions are defined largely by 
cultural affinity, used in the anthropological sense as a set of shared values and practices that 
distinguish a group. State political power is often employed in an attempt to create a national 
culture. A particular focus of this research falls on the country of Bhutan, which codified state-
related cultural practices in visibly distinct dress, architecture, language and behaviour 
regulations known as “One Nation, One People” at the outset of the Sixth Five Year Plan in 
January 1989. Later sections of this paper show how such distinctions, carried by migrants from 
other areas, have significant political ramifications as people are excluded, included or 
overwhelm bordering political areas, causing ongoing international tensions. 
The goal of this study is to illustrate how borders matter as politically potent cultural identifiers 
by tracing the historical evolution and continuing contestation around current borders, 
considering the permeability and penetration points of even as formidable a barrier as the 
Himalayas. In a region ringed by these heights, numerous pressures on strategically important 
boundaries include the desire to retain lowland areas for agricultural and military access, along 
with passes through high mountain areas (Figure 1). As the opening quote by India's founding 
Prime Minister Nehru suggests, the physical boundary is perceived as the furthest extension of a 
strategic political interest by parties on both sides of it. By way of categorisation, the term 
“nation-state” is used for a larger scale political entity than a “state”, except for quoted 
references preserving its use in the source. The case of Sikkim even illustrates a sliding down 
this scale, from an independent nation-state to a state within India. 
 
FIGURE 1 Landscape regions in the Himalaya. 
 
The following study of an under-examined region of the world demonstrates the multiple issues 
involved in border demarcations, primarily over the last sixty years of political change. Although 
Lord Curzon at the turn of the twentieth century famously likened frontiers to a “razor's edge” 
tripwire separating war/peace and life/death of nation-states, one hundred years later the spectre 
of nuclear engagement leads to boundary blurring and nudged readjustment. Such shifts in 
international boundaries reflect outcomes of global geopolitics as they play out on the ground, 
relocating people along cartographic contours. 2 Borders in the eastern Himalaya indicate 
demarcation lines at the far edges of a multinational power struggle. As mountain ranges resulted 
from the physical collision between the Indian and East Asian tectonic plates, so this region is 
politically re-shaped by the ongoing contest between the continental powers of India and China. 
Like the conflicting geologic forces underneath them, China proclaims it is a “peaceful rising” 
continental power while it joins India in exerting relentless pressure on their contingent 
neighbours and closely monitoring alignments. The entities at their interstices sometimes subside 
under such forces, as illustrated in the following case studies. 
Consideration falls on three particular aspects of borders, negotiated through shifts in population 
and politics: enduring physical features such as passes, evolved historical-cultural boundaries, 
and the shifting political borders that map them. First, physical features set off distinct areas in 
this region; passes function as transgressive spaces through which elements intrude that can be 
significantly different from those prevailing within the boundaries entered. This section 
spotlights the political pivot points of strategic passes in Sikkim, Bhutan and the Chumbi Valley 
of Tibet, which constitute a long-standing arena for the power play between those controlling the 
Indian and Chinese land masses (Figure 2). These passes serve as strategic mountain chokepoints 
critical in global power competition, analogous to Mahan's assertion of the importance of control 
of waterway straits. 3 In this case control involves headwaters of major Asian rivers that can 
serve as hydropower sources. Political forces that manage and impact access to strategic riverine 
regions are particularly important and understudied as they relate to developing countries on the 
periphery of major population centres and global attention. 
 
FIGURE 2 Political boundaries, major passes, rivers and urban areas in Bhutan and surrounding 
region. 
The historical narrative in the second section explains the evolution of regional configurations as 
political-cultural alliances, while the third section traces their contemporary outcomes. The 
discussion of whether political or cultural considerations form the primary determinant for 
national affiliation is inconclusive. In the case of Bhutan, both culturally distinct ethnic Nepalis 
and culturally similar Tibetans were given the choice of citizenship or expulsion in the 1990s, 
but the onus of proof fell more heavily on the former. 4 From its cultural hearth in India the 
Vajrayana Buddhism practiced in Tibet, Bhutan, and by the former dominant group in Sikkim 
maintains its politically protected status only in Bhutan, which acknowledges heritage links with 
bordering countries and conceives of its boundaries as classically encompassing a culturally 
cohesive entity. 5 Bhutanese liken their situation to “a yam between two boulders”, referring 
both to the historic squeeze between Tibet and British India as well as the contemporary tug of 
interests between China and India. 6 Borders still matter. 
Theoretical Framework 
Categorisation of borders largely falls into two camps: an older approach that focused on the role 
of geographic features in defining and maintaining borders, 7 and another that prioritises the 
examination of borders' functions and their formation processes. 8 An updated extension of the 
latter approach considers the concrete surface political lines as a manifestation of dynamic forces 
underlying socio-cultural processes. 9 This study looks at borderlands in the eastern Himalaya as 
spaces controlled by nation-states whose boundaries demonstrate the shifting demarcations of 
power contestations and the politics of identity that seek to preserve distinctiveness. These can 
be codified as in the “One Nation, One People” proclamation, or seen in attempts of various 
rebel groups such as the Assamese and Gurkha to carve out autonomous territories. This study 
illustrates the important fluidity of borders along with the constant assertion that they are being 
regularised to reflect a container of permanent, cognitively distinct categories. 10 
Culture is not co-terminus with political borders even in this physically segmented region, but 
boundaries serve to define regions of historically concentrated cultures that are later re-aligned as 
counter-affiliated frontier zones. Regional examples are China's Buddhist Tibet versus India's 
Buddhist Sikkim (overwhelmed by Hindu Nepali migrants just prior to its absorption into India) 
and independent Buddhist Bhutan. Forms of culturally based allegiance signifiers to the political 
system can include language and clothing as well as a value system, if not the religion(s) at their 
root. Passes act as transboundary permeations. Places where people flow in to subvert or support 
politically relevant cultural practices are also of interest, since they can be controlled and flows 
cut off, encouraged, or re-directed depending on the political will of the entities on either side of 
them. 11 
Changes in boundary lines reflect the type of nation-states that they touch: militarily strong and 
aggressive, or passive defensive. Borders are produced by varying pressures at different points, 
some flexibly adjusted and others hotly preserved, responding to demographic, political-
economic, military, and cultural considerations. Borders function as physical and political 
boundaries that reflect the multiple natures of the dynamic socio-spatial entities that they contain 
and separate. At present several areas of the eastern Himalaya borders are under negotiation, 
while passes are also correspondingly creaking open in a controlled, tentative and wary manner. 
The accompanying trepidation acknowledges concern over the fragility of the situation in flux, 
affecting societies with unwanted but begrudgingly necessary openness due to economic 
globalisation and military pressures. While the physical line of the Himalayan massif and valleys 
between ridges remain clear border demarcations, slippage occurs as a border on Bhutan's 
northwestern frontier recently slid from the top of a range to the southern foothills, 
acknowledging China's infrastructure penetration and diplomatic demands. The form of the 
border followed the function of hegemonic power flexing, with joint Indo-Bhutanese scattered 
border patrols unequal to the task of covering a vast region populated largely by Tibetan-related 
ethnic herders. Borders remain important as containers of culture, while both culture and land 
cover shrink in the Buddhist homelands of Tibet and Nepal. 
The next section of this discussion notes the physical features and major passes involved in the 
movement of people, culture, and economic links in this part of the Himalaya. The third section 
highlights historical events that determined political dominance in the region from the pre-
colonial period through independence, re-consolidating areas of influence and attempting to 
preserve the cultural integrity of buffer entities. The use of current names for political entities 
(e.g., India, Tibet) in reference to historical events involving differently configured boundaries 
should be understood as referring to populations who belonged to areas in this region 
distinguished, for example, by linguistic groups or the control of a particular ruler. These areas in 
most cases became part of the modern political entity with which they are identified. The third 
section considers the political-economic implications of the current situation. The conclusion 
summarises implications for theory in light of the ongoing contest for the control of borders 
caught in dynamic cross-currents of politics, economics and culture shifting boundaries to reflect 
new configurations. 
PHYSICAL FEATURES, TRANSGRESSIVE PASSES 
The dominant physical factor in this region is the towering Himalayan mountain range, created 
by the ancient physical collision of two tectonic plates that joined mainland Asia and the Indian 
subcontinent. High passes, often formed by river flows, provide infrequent and therefore 
strategically important transportation access routes (Table 1). The passes of Jelupla and Natula 
(“la” means “pass”, and is customarily included in the proper name) on the Chumbi Valley's 
western border are of particular significance, along with several more northern remote openings. 
China currently controls Tibet's Chumbi Valley, a wedge-shaped extrusion of land between 
Sikkim (now absorbed into India) and the independent but Indian-aligned parliamentary 
monarchy of Bhutan. Nepal, with its recently democratically deposed monarchy, communist 
insurgents, and restive migratory Hindu majority population, lies on the western border of the 
former Sikkim. Attention to the geographical importance of borders falls on 1) the Chumbi 
Valley of Tibet intervening between Bhutan and India's Sikkim province, 2) the Siliguri corridor 
(or “chicken neck”) running through West Bengal province between Nepal and Bangladesh 
through eastern Sikkim, and 3) the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the 
Northeastern Frontier Area, or NEFA) bordering eastern Bhutan. 
TABLE 1 Strategic Passes 
Pass       Connection   Direction  Internal  Height 
Sikkim       Tibet – Chumbi Valley       
  Jelepla     Chumbi Valley   East       14,390 
  Natula      Yatung    East       14,200 
  Patrala      Chumbi Valley   East       14,240 
Bhutan 
  Tremola    Pari (CV) – Paro (B)  West       15,000 
  Lingshi     Punakha (B) – Shigatse (T) West     
  Laitsawa   Bumthang (B) – Lhasa (T) North     
  Thunkar    Lhasa (T)     East   Rudenla  12,600 
Pass       Connection   Direction  Internal  Height 
Shingbe   Dozam Valley Tashigang (B) – Tibet East   Pelela   11,055 
Sinchula  Phuentsholing (B) – W. Bengal (I) Southwest   5,700 
Gelephu   Assam (I) via Tongsa and Dangmei R. South     
Dewangiri Assam (I), Duar Plain  Southeast     
Nyingsangla Arunachal Pradesh/Tawang East    
 
Human settlement on the southern side of the Himalayan massif largely occurred in the few 
economically sustainable pockets of a very challenging environment. Migrants came from either 
Tibet, moving south via a very small number of relatively low passes (note northern and western 
borders of Bhutan in Figure 2), or Nepali-Indian areas, spreading out from relatively densely 
settled sites further south or west. Most inhabitants practiced herding, given the marginal quality 
of the steep land available for agriculture, as do the migratory nomads in the higher reaches of 
this region today. The technique of attempting to extend political-military power along the 
footpaths of wandering nomads and their flocks remains popular among aspiring Chinese 
occupiers. Passes through the Chumbi valley featured most prominently in the history of this 
region. Two rivers – Sikkim's Tista and western Bhutan's Ammo Chu (“chu” meaning “river” in 
Dzongka) – served as major trade routes. 12 Sikkim's capital city of Gangtok lies on an historic 
trade route to Tibet via the Natula pass, running south to Rangpo, Kalimpong and Siliguri, the 
Indian base in the plains. 
Sikkim's earliest known inhabitants of Indian ancestry are called the Lepchas; the predominantly 
Buddhist group of Tibetan ancestry are the Bhotias, known as Ngalops in Bhutan. While this 
group settled largely in the western area of Bhutan closest to Sikkim and the northern region 
close to Tibet, the other two major demographic entities in Bhutan are the Sharchops (the oldest 
residents, largely in the eastern part of the country) and the Lhotshampa, the most recent 
immigrants whose Hindu ethnicity is closer to that of India and Nepal. Reasons for the 
Himalayan aligned physical and political fissure between Chinese-occupied Tibet on the 
mountain ranges' heights and Tibet's cultural cousins but India-aligned political entities of 
Sikkim and Bhutan on the mountains' southern flanks are the subject of the next section. 
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY AND POWER POLITICS 
Using historic examples, this study illustrates the importance of considering the geopolitical role 
of borders as containers (albeit permeable at puncture points) for dynamic human processes at 
work defining the nation-states they inhabit. Bhutan serves as the primary focus for this 
examination due to its active attempts to use its border as a survival mechanism, seeking to 
preserve its unique culture by practicing the “politics of identity” to contain basically only those 
who share it 13 
Chinese maps indicate that China considered Sikkim and Bhutan as part of Tibet since the 
second century based on cultural affinity, a claim strengthened by China's own incorporation into 
the Mongol-controlled Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368 AD). 14 Buddhist religious influences, 
originating in what is now part of southern Nepal, flowed from both India and Tibet and came to 
include the Mongols. Physically, the boundary between northern Bhutan and Tibet generally ran 
along the ridge line of the Himalayan heights separating the two entities. Since its consolidation 
of control over Tibet in 1959, China occasionally challenges the traditional watershed line of 
demarcation in various ways, from issuing new maps that encompass disputed territory to 
extending roads and promoting incursions by nomad herders accompanied by Chinese troops, 15 
dealt with in greater detail in Table 2 and the following chronology. 
 
TABLE 2 Chronology of Major Events Through Passes 
Date  Event 
Early 800s Early monarchies, Tibetan Buddhist culture established 
1000–1600 Tibetan invasions, repulsed 
Circa 1700 Bhutan, then Tibet, invade Sikkim 
1770  Nepal, Bhutan and Cooch Behar (India) invade Sikkim 
1774  Treaty of Cooch Behar: British India controls lowland Himalayan trade 
1835  Sikkim loses Darjeeling 
1865  Treaty of Sinchula ends Duar War; Bhutan loses plains to British India 
1890s  Sikkim loses Chumbi Valley to India, eastern land to Bhutan 
1895  Pamir Boundary Commission sets India borders in relation to watersheds 
1903  Younghusband invades Tibet through Chumbi Valley, Bhutan 
1907  Ugyen Wangchuk sides with British India vs. Tibet, establishes monarchy 
1910  China invades Tibet; Britain-Bhutan Treaty of Punakha 
1913–1914 Simla Conference: British Indian “Dawang Salient” east of Bhutan 
1949  China invades Tibet; India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship as “protectorate” 
1950  Sikkim protectorate of India; Indo-Nepali “Treaty of Peace & Friendship” 
1954  Tibetan uprising; Chinese maps diminishing Bhutan 
1958  Nehrus to Bhutan via Chumbi Valley; Chinese maps diminish Bhutan 
1959  Dalai Lama to India; Bhutan-India Border Roads Organization 
1960  Bhutan closes border to Tibet due to China takeover 
1961  Chinese maps of Bhutan more moderate; India aids Bhutan, First Five Year Plan 
1962  Sino-Indian war in Himalayan region involves Bhutan border incursions 
1967  Second Sino-Indian War, Sikkim's Natula Pass 
1973–1974 Nepali riots in Sikkim lead to absorption into India 
1984  First (India-sanctioned) Sino-Bhutanese talks over border incursions 
1989  Indian embargo over Nepali goods to protest Chinese contacts 
2006  Final establishment of India-Bhutan border 
 
Conflicts between Tibet and Bhutan occurred in the early 1600s, followed by invasions of 
Sikkim by Bhutanese forces in 1680 and 1700 and an incursion from Tibet in 1714. In 1770, 
Nepal nibbled off a part of Sikkim west of the Tista River and India's Cooch Behar principality 
joined Bhutan for an invasion of Sikkim. Two years later Great Britain, in the interest of its 
Indian colony, invaded Bhutan, leading to the Treaty of Cooch Behar in 1774 whereby India 
reclaimed its control over the lowland. The significance of these conflicts, with British interests 
represented by the East India Company, lay precisely with the multi-nation recognition of the 
Nepal-Sikkim-Bhutan-princely Indian state's strategic location in relation to trade across and 
through the Himalayas. Sikkim lost the hill station of Darjeeling in 1835 and the Chumbi Valley 
in the late 1890s to British India, as well as land in the east to Bhutan. 16 
Ensuing intermittent boundary disputes led to the1864–1865 Duar War, swiftly concluded by the 
loss of 3,000 square miles of Bhutan's subtropical plains to British India in the Treaty of 
Sinchula. The word “duar” means “passes”, which in the case of the Assam-Bengal-Bhutanese 
lowlands varied from ten to twelve miles and afforded easy access to the plains spreading south 
at the abruptly rising highland region characterising the rest of Bhutan. Only Nepal remains large 
enough to internally encompass lowland (“terai” in Nepal), foothills and Himalayan sections. 
Tibetans invaded Sikkim in 1886–1887 through the Chumbi Valley and Bhutanese territory via 
the town of Pari, close to Yatung in Tibet, an important way-station for India-Tibet interactions. 
Yatung was the crossroads, until the 1959 Chinese invasion, for trade between India, Bhutan, 
Sikkim and Tibet. 17 Now most trade takes place with and through India. 
The path of British general Younghusband's 1903–1911 forays from the Siliguri valley of India 
through its protectorate of Sikkim and into Tibet by way of the Chumbi valley came through the 
pass at Jelupla improved for that purpose by English engineers. From Siliguri the best approach 
to Tibet ran through the towns of Kalimpong in the foothills to Pedong (4,000 feet), Gnathong 
(12,000 feet), over 14,300 feet to Yatung (11,000 feet) via the Chumbi valley (9,000 feet) and 
the town of Pari to Gyangtse, connecting to Xigaze. An alternate route through Sikkim crossed 
Kangra La (16,400 feet) via the Lachen gorge of the Tista and Arun rivers. 18 Control of the 
Chumbi Valley corridor clearly conferred access to Tibet and the quickest route to the capital 
Lhasa. 
In the 1903–1907 period local Bhutanese ruler Ugyen Wangchuck leveraged control of Bhutan 
for his Wangchuck family with Britain's blessing in return for stability on colonial India's 
northern border. Previously the strongman of central Bhutan, his assistance of the Younghusband 
invasion of Tibet led to influential British endorsement of his aspirations to control all of Bhutan, 
confirmed by his installation as hereditary monarch in 1907. Similar to India's arrangement half a 
century later, the Bhutanese were promised friendship with the land to their south on condition 
that they not consort with any other major power – particularly the one to their north. 19 In 
another historical precursor, China's invasion of Tibet in 1910 precipitated the British-Bhutanese 
Treaty of Punakha that same year. Following the Pamir Boundary Commission of 1895, this 
agreement formed the basis for the 1949 India-Bhutan treaty defining Bhutan's relationship as a 
protectorate of India. The Commission emphasised that “geographically, politically, and 
ethnographically watersheds … are the only true and stable boundaries in th[is] region … the 
possession up to the headwaters of each system by one people constitutes the only frontier that 
has survived the lapse of time”. 20 The underlying goal on the part of parties controlling India 
was to firm up their influence with Bhutan in light of its northern border with India's competitor. 
21 No less than fourteen passes link Bhutan with what is now the Chinese possession of Tibet. 
While not considered a part of India by the British, Sikkim was included in India's sphere as an 
administrative protectorate. The British appointed a political office to re-structure Sikkim's 
affairs in 1888, formalising control from New Delhi. By the Indian census of 1891, Nepalese 
initially brought in to assist with road and building construction composed half of Sikkim's 
population, reflecting the British appraisal of their usefulness as a counter to Tibetan parts of the 
population. A century later, the 2001 census confirmed that three quarters of Sikkim was 
inhabited by Nepalese. The dispensation of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Kashmir, and Ladakh along 
India's Himalayan border was seen by India to be best secured by construing them “… as buffer 
and, as far as possible, client states” 22 in relation to China-fronting Tibet. The 1949 Treaty of 
Friendship between Britain and India formalised the handover of Bhutan's mentorship to the 
newly independent South Asian power. Sikkim's fate followed a different path, as China's 
activities in Tibet soon reminded India of the historic importance of the Himalayan region. In the 
middle of June 1949 the Indian Political Officer informed the Sikkim cabinet they were 
dismissed in favour of direct rule by India. British administrative control was maintained by an 
Indian official loaned to Sikkim as a Prime Minister. In December 1950 Sikkim became an 
exclusive protectorate of India. Sikkim negotiated its status in light of India's turnover from a 
British colony to an independent continental giant, assured of “autonomy” by a treaty in late 
1950. India furnished both funds and employees to the government of Sikkim – including 
appointing advisers that would ultimately lead to Sikkim's merger with India. 
With its numerous Himalaya-piercing paths, Nepal rose in India's strategic estimation 
commensurate with China's rising dominance in Tibet. The “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” 
signed in 1950 between the two predominantly Hindu neighbours tilted Nepal's historically 
careful balance between China and India. Politically, economically, and culturally India's 
influence dominated Nepal, as India became increasingly involved in attempts to balance Nepal's 
de-stabilising nature between an autocratic monarchy and the impoverished, discontented 
subjects. 
Tibetan uprisings in 1954–1955 heightened India's alarm over regional instability. China's 1954 
publication of A Brief History of China including maps allocating to China large pieces of 
Bhutanese territory raised alarms in both Bhutan and India. 23 Chinese maps published four 
years later included all of Bhutan's southeast Trashigang District and large sections in the 
northeast as part of China. 24 The situation in Tibet unsettled both Nehru and Bhutan's third 
king, as China moved increasingly aggressively to establish its control on the Himalayas 
northern side. In September 1958 India's Prime Minister Nehru, accompanied by his daughter 
(and future Prime Minister) Indira, travelled to Thimphu on animal back via Gangtok, Sikkim 
and the Chumbi Valley to express support for Bhutan's independence. An active Border Roads 
Organization established the next year, following the Dalai Lama's forced flight out of Tibet 
under Chinese duress, was a direct outcome of the earlier trip. Bhutan's army perched on the 
country's northern border to alert Indian troops of any Chinese incursions; both armies currently 
conduct extensive joint training. Bhutan closed its northern border in 1959 following the escape 
of the Dalai Lama through the Chumbi Valley during the Chinese takeover of Tibet. The 
People's Liberation Army took this occasion to consolidate their control over eight Bhutanese 
enclaves across the Tibetan border. The next year Chinese incursions spilled over the border, and 
Bhutan cut off historic Himalayan trade over the passes with Tibet. In 1961 China published a 
new, less assertive Himalayan map including the two-hundred-mile, largely undemarcated 
border. 
Bhutan's modernisation began with the aid of concerned mentor India. At India's urging, the First 
Five Year Plan introduced in 1961 featured road building, following the Nehru's rugged trip in 
1958. This infrastructure tie also permitted Indian troop movement to shore up Bhutanese 
defences in the face of Chinese threats. In 1961 Bhutan also joined the Colombo Plan. Indians 
design and build many of Bhutan's roads and bridges with Indian labourers, and its troops are 
stationed in and around the major cities of Thimphu and Paro. India demonstrated its need for 
access to Bhutan when its troops retreated through Bhutanese territory during the Sino-Indian 
border war in 1962. That same year war broke out along the Manas River pass linking the Assam 
plain to Phuentsholing, involving three anti-Indian rebel groups who were taking refuge on 
Bhutan's side of the dense jungle along the southeastern border. Nepal narrowly escaped serving 
as a battleground for both the 1962 and 1967 Sino-Indian clashes during the Natula Pass 
confrontation on Sikkim's border. India's hold over Nepal lies in its ability to shut off Nepal's 
markets, since it is too expensive to ship out goods other than through India. 25 
By 1967, the demographic makeup of Sikkim was 20% Bhutia Lepshas, 70% Nepalese – a 
dangerously low minority in their own country. Contacts with China by Sikkim's monarch 
provoked Indian unhappiness, as it sought to control Sikkim's external relations. India's policy 
with Bhutan followed the Third Druk Gyalpo's interest in opening up his country as assurance 
against a spillover of Chinese activity in occupied Tibet. Bhutan was permitted to join the United 
Nations in 1971, and in 1972 the young Fourth Druk Gyalpo Jigme Singye Wangchuck assumed 
the throne untimely vacated by his ill father. In 1973, Nepali migrants instigated riots against 
Sikkim's monarch, leading to intervention by Indian military forces to restore order. Continuing 
popular unhappiness with the monarch's rule led to demonstrations in 1974 that furnished an 
opportunity for India to assert more direct control over the monarchy. India's representatives 
presided over an election in April 1974, following an Indian-instigated “palace coup”, that 
abolished the monarch and made Sikkim “a constituent unit of India” followed by its relegation 
to an “associated state” by December 1974. 26 Indian troops deployed at Natula pass in April 
1975, asserting their direct control over the pass to Tibet. The northern border of Bhutan remains 
largely a nature reserve, traversed by nomads and lightly settled by villages consisting of a 
handful of households. Bhutan's reputation as an ecological treasure serves as a tourist pull and 
generates income from the sale of medicinal herbs gathered by local residents and nomads. 
Chinese incursions occur on a variety of pretexts, most obviously in a 1979 “herder” intrusion 
that led to India-sanctioned direct Sino-Bhutan talks in 1984. 27 The status of Tibetan refugees 
in Bhutan was also settled in 1979: accept Bhutanese citizenship, or leave. 28 
As with the other Himalayan nation-states, almost any land passage flows are far easier through 
India. This “geographic trump card” 29 was invoked to discipline Nepal in 1989, with decisive 
results from the demonstration of landlocked and mountain-blocked dependency on India for 
significant trade and transit. Kuti Pass, crossing within Nepal at Kodari on the route between 
Kathmandu-Lhasa, is rivalled only by the Chumbi valley passes for strategic trans-Himalayan 
access. Several other Nepal-Tibet roads (at Pokhara and Dazhu) were constructed with Chinese 
assistance leading up to the 1989 blockade of Nepal by India to protest an increasingly 
intolerable threat to the trans-Himalayan balance of power. 
The underlying threat of the India-China alignment question came for Nepal with their differing 
support for allied forms of governance, with India representing democratisation and autocratic 
China tilting pro-monarchy. Recognition, along with resentment, of India's geographically 
enabled hegemony over Nepal continues in China, with the alternative the improvement and 
extension of a road and rail network through Tibet to its Himalayan borders – and beyond. 
China's early mapped recognition of the cultural ties shared by Mongolia, Tibet, Bhutan, and 
Sikkim on her northern and western borders, and the contemporary claim to include several of 
these within China's realm by virtue of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty patron-priest or tributary 
relationship, underlines the role of history and culture on political borders. 
THE GREAT GAME CONTINUES 
India and China's maneuvers to assert their own areas of control over the Himalayan heights 
resemble an extension of Britain and Russia's “Great Game” from an earlier century. 30 Indian 
Army detachments occupied parts of Lhasa and Yatong until China's takeover of Tibet in 1959, 
continuing Britain's assessment of the importance of this corridor. 31 The “chicken neck” of the 
Siliguri corridor, at only 20–30 km wide, links upland and lowland India in this region via the 
150-foot-long Jelupla pass or the Natula Pass 5 km to the north. Chinese People's Liberation 
Army troops in Yatung control the Chumbi valley wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan. 32 
China's consolidation of its control of Tibet is seen by India as necessitating an Indian line of 
influence on the adjoining edges across the Himalayas, rejecting China's calls for it to have an 
“equal relationship” with what India considers its clients, counter-balancing the Chinese 
absorption of Tibet. 33 The ongoing pushing of two large political powers against each other at 
opposing edges of the Himalayas gives no sign of either one subsiding or rising. Geographically, 
the Himalayas serve as a defensive barrier at both power's periphery. 
Passes serve as either corridors of conflict or commerce. Construction of transportation 
infrastructure to heighten control of land, especially in areas around political boundaries, 
involves economic and military extensions of power. Roads deliver major ecological, economic, 
political, cultural, and demographic impacts, particularly in fragile, contested regions. Chinese 
soldiers were detected within Bhutan in November 2005, crossing bridges extending from 
roadways in remote areas of four northwestern districts, from which they later retreated. 34 
Bhutan's maximum width of 300 km stretches more than three times that of Sikkim (88 km), but 
it is only one-third the size of Nepal. The boundary abutting India runs 605 km, compared with 
the contested border with China at 470 km. 35 The development of eastern Tibet's Chumbi 
valley, Bhutan's Haa Valley, and India's Darjeeling and West Bengal draw from similar 
Himalayan foothill resource potentials: hydropower, herders, eco-tourism and border trade. 
Bhutan's 31,000 megawatts of hydroelectric power could significantly assist India's power needs, 
particularly if the proposed US-India nuclear power treaty fails to go through. However, a 
rapidly developing Bhutan foresees problems meeting its own energy demands from industrial 
users, at least until anticipated new and larger dams become productive. Bhutan's economy 
remains tightly linked to India's, especially due to hydropower provision – the biggest source of 
income from trade and financing of capital projects, and the biggest expenditures/accounts 
deficits for new dams. 
Preservation of the “Tawang salient” on Bhutan's eastern border also is of interest to India in 
trying to wall off China's southern options of expansion routes. The pre-McMahon boundary put 
the northern border of India's Assam state parallel to Bhutan's southern border and close to the 
Brahmaputra River. The McMahon Line created a “Northeast Frontier Agency” (NEFA) 
encompassing the town of Tawang, with a largely Tibetan population. This consequently 
enlarged the extent of Bhutan's eastern border with India at the expense of Tibet, and thus 
modern China, as sanctioned in the Simla Conference of 1913–1914. 36 
An ongoing irritant in Bhutan-China relations lies with China's desire for an “equal relationship” 
with Nepal and Bhutan, while India insists on maintaining its “special” relationship with these 
two entities. The first contact regarding Bhutan's disputed northwest border since it was closed 
by Bhutan in 1959 came as a letter from Chinese Premier Chou Enlai to Indian Prime Minister 
Nehru. The basic issue involves demarcations along ridge lines, passes, and river banks. 37 
Bilateral Bhutan-China border talks began in 1984. Detection of Chinese incursions via logging 
roads in 1996 led to the 1998 China and Bhutan conclusion of an “Agreement to Maintain Peace 
and Tranquility” concerning their shared border and Bhutan's status as an independent nation-
state, the first significant bilateral agreement on the topic. China “reiterates its position to fully 
respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bhutan”, 38 but the agreement 
fell short of establishing the political border defining the territory in question. A comparison with 
the boundary of 1989 often used as a baseline, with a reconfigured boundary shown on maps 
published since 2006 by several Bhutanese government departments, indicate that Bhutan itself 
is publishing maps showing a significantly diminished northern boundary that runs at the 
southern foot of the Himalayas rather than along the traditional ridge line or northern side of the 
mountain range. A northwestern slice of Ha province under consideration for accession to China 
in return for a complete boundary agreement has concerned India. Talks continue on an 
intermittent basis. 
Construction of roads in Bhutan's western and northern border areas with China involve two 
particular considerations: the ecological sensitivity of the Bhutanese government which seeks to 
preserve no less than 60–70% of area as forested, and the military notion of keeping Bhutan's 
borders without major roads in order to hinder passage of incoming troops from the Chinese side. 
While troops from India, Bhutan, and China maintain positions in this area, most incursions and 
complaints involve timber extraction, animal herders, and nomads hunting for profitable 
medicinal plants. 39 A final agreement on the Indo-Bhutan border was concluded in mid-
December 2006, leaving “the tri-junction with China” the only outstanding major border issue. 
40 A new treaty between India and Bhutan concluded in February 2007 gave Bhutan greater 
freedom to pursue its own foreign affairs outside of India's prior knowledge and consent. This 
arrangement carried particular relevance for Sino-Bhutan boundary settlement negotiations. 41 
Significantly, maps of Bhutan's northern border published since the year 2006 by two different 
departments in the Bhutanese government show a very different boundary line in Gaza province 
that runs south rather than north of the Himalayas as previously reflected in the base map of 
1989. 42 Although the maps state that depictions “should not be considered an Authority on the 
Delineation of the International Boundary” 43 (DSLR 2006), they do reflect permission to depict 
this significant change following the seventeenth boundary discussion session with China. 
Indications that a section of Haa province on Chumbi Valley's eastern border might be ceded to 
China come from negative commentary in the Indian and Bhutanese press reflecting on the 
historically strategic importance of this access to the Siliguri corridor. 44 In both cases the 
contemplated adjustments followed Bhutanese complaints of Chinese road incursions in these 
areas. Geographic access difficulties of terrain and climate melt in the face of military 
determination creating a reality on the ground. 
Bhutan strategises maintenance of its demographic and cultural continuity in the face of external 
and internal migration. Its first accurate, total-count census, conducted over two days in mid-
2004, found that “Migrants from Foreign Countries” comprised 6.9% of the country's population 
(44,420 out of a total of 634,982 occupants). Of these, 7,098 declined to state their country of 
origin. Most migrants are assumed to be Indians, who occupy a substantial number of the 
unskilled and low-skill labour jobs, particularly following large-scale expulsion of Nepalis two 
decades previously and the reluctance of Bhutanese to take such positions. Areas with the 
highest concentration of migrants included the capital city of Thimphu (10% of its 98,676 
population, probably due to a construction boom), and the southeastern border county of 
Pemaghatsel (21% of its 13,864 population). Major reasons given for migration in both rural and 
urban areas were for enhanced employment and education opportunities, the first and second 
most common reasons for urban dwellers, second and fourth place for rural-based migrants after 
“family” and “marriage”. 45 
The opening of Natula Pass in July 2006 for a carefully delineated segment of goods between 
India (formerly Sikkim) and China (formerly Tibet) indicated the lingering potential importance 
and political perils of this topographically linked region. Resumption of transit through Natula 
occurred along with China's formal recognition of India's incorporation of Sikkim. An all-
weather multi-lane highway is also envisioned as part of future plans, given intervening good 
behaviour. China frames its desire for restoration of relations with Bhutan as part of its “Develop 
the West” policies, seeking transit over Tibet-Bhutan passes as well. Building the world's largest 
statue of Buddha, destined to sit on the highest hill overlooking Bhutan's capital city, is seen by 
China as a major goodwill gesture – potentially to allay Bhutanese concerns with what is 
perceived as China's cultural genocide of Tibetan areas. A regional “growth triangle” spanning 
Sikkim, North Bengal, Nepal and Bhutan has been discussed, but ties to India are likely to 
remain paramount given much easier access through favourable topography. The potential 
impact of revenues from Chinese tourists, one of the major economic foci of Bhutan, remains a 
consideration for enhanced revenue generation. 
The slim link south to India via Sikkim consists of one road to Siliguri, much as Bhutan's narrow 
two-lane highway is the only cross-country route connecting its major cities. The Siliguri 
corridor “chicken neck” forms India's outpost in relation to any Chinese moves coming out of the 
Chumbi Valley. One of several extensions of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway under discussion 
involves a rail line from Tibet's capital city – with its large military sector – through the Chumbi 
valley to Yadong close to Natula Pass, bridging the Himalayan region. 46 The importance of 
India as a link to easy transportation and trade routes for Himalayan areas continues to be that 
nation-state's major advantage which China is geographically unable to offset, as demonstrated 
by the crippling blockade of Nepal in 1988 that in part answered China's military blow to India's 
regional prestige by the 1962 confrontation. 
Bhutan tries to maintain the integrity of its borders and its sovereignty in a variety of ways. Most 
dramatically, in December 2003 the Fourth King led a force of Bhutanese military in a successful 
charge along the southern border with India, a frontier contested by Assamese splinter rebel 
groups (United Liberation Front of Assam, a.k.a. ULFA) 47 This action expelled rebels seeking 
shelter from their anti-Indian activities across Bhutan's lightly populated southeastern border. 
The short campaign confirmed Bhutanese territorial control, blunting both India's offer/threat to 
cross Bhutan's boundary to deal with the rebels and China's interest in doing the same in the 
north to curb alleged Tibetan encroachments. Bhutan seeks to maintain sovereignty by 
navigating a middle path between India's “forward defence thesis” enforced by economic 
dependence and China's push for more regional influence through treaty talks and military 
means, in the name of promoting autonomy. 48 The collapse of the institution of monarchy in 
Nepal under pressure from persistent rebellion contrasts sharply with Bhutan's orderly transfer of 
power via voluntary abdication of the popular Fourth King in favour of his son and a 
parliamentary form of government. 
Geography is not destiny, as witnessed in the very different current and evolving states of 
political entities in this Himalayan region. Tibet is presently subsumed as a buffer under 
culturally distinct China. Tibet's culturally related cousin Sikkim was absorbed by culturally 
distinct India, and Bhutan (maintained by India as a client buffer state) shields itself from 
inundation by India's cultural cousin Nepal, whose migrants swamped Sikkim. To the north an 
entirely different relationship with China results in territorial loss reflecting a hegemonic nation 
extending its power over its Himalayan periphery. Strenuous efforts to consolidate, extend, 
and/or subvert power within national borders indicates the importance of these boundaries in 
relation to and reflection of the cultures they contain. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this examination of the eastern Himalayan region was to trace the historical 
evolution and contestation of borders in order to illustrate how they reflect political power 
markers played out as cultural signifiers. Borderlands in the eastern Himalaya are treated as 
spaces controlled by nation-states whose boundaries demonstrate demarcations of power 
contestations and the politics of identity that seek to preserve distinctiveness. The continuing 
shifting of borders supports theoretical assertions of the importance of boundaries and the 
malleability of territorially tied distinctions they are meant to draw. Bhutan serves as a particular 
focus of examination since it clearly considers that its threatened national integrity depends on 
controlling its borders. Bhutan's goal is to preserve the three areas of culture, economic-
environmental sustainability and political control. This triple-layered territoriality of national 
legitimacy 49 is projected over a physical landscape along linear (often corresponding to 
physical) demarcations. 
Consideration of the multi-layered roots of the eastern Himalayan region's fragile frontier zones 
is crucial for analytical understanding of its importance and contested prognosis for future 
development. Boundaries in this geographically isolated region changed markedly over the past 
century, reflecting the flow of political power and cultural influences in an environment only 
lightly sliced through by transit via mountain passes 50 (Table 2). Plains on Bhutan's southern 
boundary were largely ceded to India during Britain's imperial hegemony, which also inserted 
still-maintained land buffers with Sinified Tibet along Bhutan's eastern (Tibetan demographic 
Tawang) and western (Siliguri corridor) borders. China and India, as well as their bordering (and 
former) governments have reason to appreciate the role of major passes, valleys, corridors and 
lowland access points in their Himalayan interstices since their control is vital to defending the 
borders of nation-states which such access routes span. Most prominent among these are the 
Siliguri corridor (West Bengal's “chicken neck” access through the former country of Sikkim 
between Nepal and Tibet), the Chumbi Valley of Tibet (separating India's Sikkim from Bhutan, 
and a historic route to Lhasa), and Bhutan's other passes to Tibet, the Tawang salient and Assam 
(Table 1). 
Areas from Sikkim in the west through Arunachal Pradesh east of Bhutan share a similar 
Buddhist culture, Tibetan demographics, and de-stabilising impacts from neighbouring Nepal, 
China and India. None possess self-sufficient economies, but depend on trade outlets with 
lowland India. The flood of Nepali immigrants that swamped Sikkim led to enforcement of rules 
visibly setting off Bhutanese distinctiveness in order to tighten any leaks in its cultural container 
defined by space and practices. 51 Quiet adjustments in a section of the northwestern border 
reflect military and political pressure from China, shifting the boundary to the southern foothills 
of the Himalaya to consolidate China's control over the entire range, rather than just a line along 
the highest rim of a land sparsely populated by nomads. That these nomads share an ethnicity 
and cultural affinity with China's restive, poorly integrated province of Tibet possibly motivates 
China's desire for geographically enhanced control of their space. 
The preceding examination reveals that successful demarcation of boundaries in this region only 
occurs in response to the power of a nation to enforce them. Power relations reflecting economic 
and military considerations bound space 52 ; cultural preservation makes space worth delimiting. 
53 In light of the historic importance of rare passes through the world's highest mountain range 
and great power expansion, the nature of Himalayan borders in this region merit continued 
interest. The areas of greatest potential political instability also encompass areas of rare and 
fragile cultural and ecological preserves. A triad of political, economic and military concerns 
feed India's fervent desire to assure a preeminent position in its Nepal-Bhutan client zone, 
continuing colonial Britain's balance of power. China seeks to rekindle the Himalayan countries' 
cultural and economic ties with Tibet via the traditional overland route. The stakes for Bhutan 
include cultural continuity, ecological sovereignty, and regional political-economic partnerships 
to maintain viable boundaries in a tenuous environment on the stairs to the roof of the world. The 
extension of geopolitical boundary theory to encompass a broad consideration of the human and 
physical forces underlying dynamic political borders serves to explain past shifts and indicate 
fault lines for possible political seismic activity, yielding a more robust arena for geographic 
examination of evolving regions. 
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